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is the report of forensic psychologist expert Michael Weiner. The 
Weiner report showed that Khadr was mature beyond his years 
and responsible for his actions. Ultimately, Omar was considered a 
valuable prisoner because of his intellect and the fact that he had 
been “too close” to Bin Laden on a personal basis. Nevertheless, the 
real embarrassment was Canada’s slow response to his incarceration, 
unlike Australia and Great Britain, where the arrest of its citizens 
involved with Al-Qaeda were quickly dealt with. What is required of 
csis, according to the authors, is reform in watchdog organizations and 
greater public accountability in the interest of human rights (p. 519).
In spite of its problems of exclusion in the research into more 
recent history, Secret Service provides a comprehensive overview 
of the evolution of Canada’s capabilities and objectives in political 
policing. The information is presented in a refreshingly jargon-free 
manner, in contrast to a number of works which discuss the overall 
idea that the state assumed that white middle class values were under 
siege in the twentieth century. Readers vaguely familiar with the 
course of Canadian history in this period will find the book easy to 
follow, since it is presented chronologically rather than thematically 
and, for the most part, sticks to a rigid formula of history of events: 
including the Fenian raids, the Winnipeg General Strike, The October 
Crisis, the ongoing War on Terror.
CURTIS B. ROBINSON, INDEPENDENT RESEARCHER
And All Their Glory Past: Fort Erie, Plattsburgh and the Final 
Battles in the North, 1814. Donald Graves. Montreal: Robin Brass 
Studios, 2013. Pp. 400.
Donald Graves has again contributed to the historiography of the 
War of 1812 with And A ll Their Glory Past: Fori. Erie, Plattsburgh 
and the Final Battles in the North, 1814. Part of a trilogy that 
includes Where Right, and Glory Lead! The Battle of Lundy’s Lane, 
1814 (1997), and Field of Glory: The Battle of Grysler’s Farm (1999), 
the author’s purpose in And All Their Glory Past is to describe the 
concluding campaigns of the war -those on the Niagara peninsula, 
the Plattsburg campaign, the British amphibious operations on the 
American seaboard, and McArthur’s Raid in what was then western 
Canada. Graves covers both land and naval aspects of the campaign
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and demonstrates, in the carefully organized five parts of this book, 
a superlative narrative style and an ability to correct long-standing 
myths.
In the first two parts of the book, Graves provides a detailed and 
well-balanced account of the lead up to and then the night assault on 
Fort Erie. The American troops had the better of this encounter with 
the British being plagued by difficulties. The British commander, 
Lieutenant-General Gordon Drummond, did not assault the works 
when he first closed up to them and when they were most vulnerable. 
Subsequent bad fortune included Lieutenant-Colonel John Tucker’s 
failure at Conjocto Creek on the 2 August, the nine days lost in 
the preparation of the position of No. 1 artillery battery, and its 
poor placement— it was too far from the fort walls to effectively 
create a breach. The explosion of a small magazine in the American 
position late on the 14 August, after barely twenty-two hours of 
bombardment, led Drummond to order the assault for that night. The 
timing seems to confirm Graves’ opinion of the British army’s lack of 
siege warfare expertise, as the fort’s walls had not been breached nor 
the bombardment long enough to wear down the American defenders 
significantly. Drummond directed a major portion of his forces against 
the left side of the American lines, which had been unmolested 
by shelling. It failed disastrously, as Drummond had ordered the 
assaulting De Watteville Regiment to remove their flints from their 
rifles to preserve secrecy in their approach march. In their subsequent 
confused milling before the walls of the fort, they were easily shot 
down by the alert and waiting Americans. The attack on the right 
side of the fort nearly succeeded, but when an unexpected explosion 
in the captured demi-bastion caused massive British casualties the 
assault was spent. That evening cost Drummond 905 officers and 
men, the second highest loss the British army experienced in a single 
engagement in the war.
After this failed assault, there was a vigorous application of the 
spade on both sides of the front. The Americans further reinforced 
Fort Erie while Drummond extended his siege lines by adding 
outposts and two additional batteries, No. 2 and No. 3. The opponents 
skirmished continually, trading gun and shell fire on a daily basis. Due 
to the limited amount of artillery ammunition available, the weight 
of the daily British bombardment was weak but sufficiently galling 
to provoke the Americans in late August to plan a sally in order to 
capture the British guns. When Drummond moved his forces further
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back from the gun lines to a better encampment, Major-General 
Jacob Brown, the American commander, saw his opportunity. He 
launched the attack late on the 17 September, intending to capture 
battery No. 3 and then roll up the other two. The Americans obtained 
initial success, but then the British re-organized and counterattacked. 
There was much confused and desperate fighting across the line with 
outposts and battery positions frequently changing hands. Once the 
British recaptured most of the positions, Brown broke off the fighting 
and withdrew to the fort. As the last shots echoed over the battlefield, 
the British started a much lengthier withdrawal back up the Niagara 
peninsula to their winter positions at Burlington Heights. By 21 
September, the British position had been completely abandoned. 
This brief encounter had been costly to both sides: Brown lost 511 
men— 79 killed, 216 wounded, and 216 missing; and Drummond lost 
579 men— 115 killed, 148 wounded, and 316 missing.
By 1814 both sides had realized the importance of naval control 
of the major waterways to the successful prosecution of the overall 
campaign. Lieutenant-General Sir George Prevost, the British 
commander-in-chief, had been reinforced by over 13,000 troops from 
post-hostilities Europe during the summer, but their late arrival 
precluded all but an attempt to seize control of Lake Champlain. 
Prevost ordered his three brigades south from Montreal on the 30 
August. As Prevost’s forces pushed south the Americans, now under 
Brigadier-General Alexander Macomb, fought a delaying action. By 
the evening of the 6 September Prevost’s forces had closed up to the 
Saranac River and occupied the northern half of Plattsburg. When 
pressed to cross the river and conduct an immediate assault, Major- 
General Frederick Robinson, the commander of the 1st Brigade, 
refused as Prevost’s staff had not obtained the necessary intelligence 
on fording points or on the strength of the enemy positions. This 
un-readiness would characterize Prevost’s preparations: there was 
order— counter-order— order; there was inadequate reconnaissance 
for the final land assault; there was haphazard preparation of the 
artillery positions; and there was the constant prodding of the British 
naval commander, Captain George Downie, to hasten along his fleet 
without the development of a combined plan. The Americans forces 
were led by more vigorous and energetic commanders— Macomb by 
land and Master Commandant Thomas Macdonough by sea. Fought 
on the 11 September, the Battle of Plattsburg was largely a desperate 
and punishing naval encounter which the British quickly lost. On
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seeing the British ships striking their colours, Prevost recalled 
his assault columns just as they were closing up to the American 
positions. Later that evening Prevost’s forces began their rain-soaked 
retreat back to Canada. For the Americans, the defence of Plattsburg 
was an overwhelming success. Though Prevost had preserved his 
forces to fight another day, one of his strategic aims throughout the 
war, his handling of campaign over these two weeks would tarnish his 
reputation and soon lead to his recall.
There are a. number of minor issues with this book. First, it has 
become the habit for authors writing on the War of 1812 to include 
side-portraits of the key participants but the same ones so frequently 
appear that they have become overused. Further, in this book several 
of the entries suffer from merely repeating what is described close 
by in the text and in some instances the side-portrait, like that of 
Commander Alexander Dobbs, is at odds with the text. Second, this 
trilogy appears to have been written for a large audience with widely 
different tastes and whereas some of the modern photographs may 
aid battlefield tourists they contribute little to the narrative. Finally, 
Graves likes to describe the “after the battle” lives of the main actors, 
which presupposes an emotional attachment that I would suggest is 
not as strong for most readers as for an author who has spent hours, 
days and years exploring the detail of their lives.
O f more substantial nature, though Graves has provided a strong 
and well balanced narrative of events, those seeking in-depth analysis 
will have to seek it elsewhere. Graves proves good at puncturing some 
of the myths that have evolved around select events of the war. For 
instance, he rehabilitates the reputation of Lieutenant-Colonel William 
Drummond from his utterance of “no quarter” during the assault 
of Fort Erie and the logistic necessity of Drummond’s withdrawal 
after the sortie. There are a few points where more detailed analysis 
would have been useful. For instance, why were both Drummond’s 
and Prevost’s siege operations similarly inept and why did Downie 
give up the advantage of his long guns to close, at his hazard, with 
the American fleet on the morning of the 11th- More importantly, 
Prevost’s actual plan demands more explanation. Combined land 
and sea. operations were well practiced having occurred at Sackets 
Harbour, Oswego and even during the Burlington Races. Why was 
Prevost’s plan at Plattsburg not a combined one? A final comment 
bears on Graves’ treatment of key British leaders: Drummond is 
treated charitably even given the butcher’s bill at Fort Erie; Prevost is
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rehabilitated along the lines of John Grodzinski’s Defender of Canada 
(2013) despite his shortcomings as an operational commander; and 
Commodore James Yeo, the commander of British naval forces, is 
treated as an impediment to operations, yet he did make significant 
contributions as ably described in Robert Malcomson’s Lords of the 
Lake (1998).
Despite these criticisms, And All Their Glory Past is a fine 
concluding volume to this trilogy and covers the closing period of the 
War of 1812 in an entertaining and lucid fashion. Its breadth and 
scope make it useful to both historians and students alike.
RICH ROY, PHD, INDEPENDENT RESEARCHER
Caen Controversy: The Battle for Sword Beach IQ44. Andrew 
Stewart. Solihul: Helion & Company, 2014. Pp. 164.
Caen Controversy is a narrative account of the activities and 
performance of the 3 (British) Infantry Division that fought in 
the Sword sector on the eastern flank of the D-Day landings in 
Normandy. In order to contextualise the Division’s progress inland 
the book also describes the preparations for the landings, the 
supporting activities of the 6 Airborne Division, which protected 
the left flank of the Allied forces, and it assesses the capabilities 
and challenges facing the German defenders. The book’s aim is to 
analyse the performance of the assaulting officers and soldiers, in 
the context of the objectives set for them, to examine their relative 
success. Stewart’s narrative closes on the evening of 6 June 1944 
when, although a solid lodgement had been secured away from the 
beaches, the objective of Caen had not been taken.
The controversy described in the book stems from an enduring 
perception that 3 Br Inf Div was excessively cautious in advancing 
towards Caen and was affected by an offensive malaise which 
permeated staff and soldiers alike. The French, of course, might 
consider any controversy relating to Caen in terms of the deaths 
of over a thousand French civilians killed by the Allied Air Forces 
bombing of the city in June and July 1944, something that still
5
: "And All Their Glory Past: Fort Erie, Plattsburgh and the Final Battles in the North, 1814 (Book Review)" by Donald Graves
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2015
